FYI: Sony's Strategic initiatives to generate growth

[KissMyAss]

In April Sony filed a news release for investors with the SEC announcing their strategy to generate growth. It's a little late. Sorry. There has been a lot of news releases at Sony lately announcing new technology in the works; a mass storage optical drive in the works(initiative 4), and a collaboration with Adobe on Professional Content Production Tools (initiative 1)

And Sony's site will be the place to watch for more new and exciting technologies that will emerge from this strategy.

http://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/News/Press/index.html
______________________________________________________________________________________________
75
No.12-056E
April 12, 2012

Sony Transformation to Revitalize Electronics Business,
Generate Growth and Drive New Value Creation
“One Sony” for Change


Tokyo, April 12, 2012 – Sony Corporation (“Sony” or “the Company”) today announced a series of strategic initiatives to be introduced under the new management team established on April 1, 2012. By implementing a rapid decision-making approach that draws on the strengths of the entire Sony Group as “One Sony”, Sony aims to revitalize and grow the electronics business to generate new value, while further strengthening the stable business foundations of the Entertainment and Financial Service businesses.

Key initiatives to transform the electronics business are:
1. Strengthening core businesses (Digital Imaging, Game, Mobile)
2. Turning around the television business
3. Expanding business in emerging markets
4. Creating new businesses and accelerating innovation
5. Realigning the business portfolio and optimizing resources

By implementing the above measures, Sony will target sales of 6 trillion yen and operating income margin of 5% in its electronics business, and sales of 8.5 trillion yen, operating income margin of more than 5%, and return on equity (“ROE”) of 10% for the Sony Group overall, in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2015 (“FY14”).

Details of these five core initiatives to revitalize the electronics business and drive new growth are as follows.

1. Strengthening core businesses (Digital Imaging, Game, Mobile)

Sony is positioning digital imaging, game and mobile as the three main focus areas of its electronics business and plans to concentrate investment and technology development resources in these areas. By growing these three businesses, Sony aims to generate approximately 70% of total sales and 85% of operating income for the entire electronics business from these categories by FY14.

Digital Imaging – Sony is reinforcing its development of image sensors, signal processing technologies, lenses and other key digital imaging technologies in which it excels, and plans to leverage these technologies in both its consumer products (such as compact digital still cameras, digital video cameras and interchangeable lens digital cameras) and broadcast and professional products (such as professional use cameras and security cameras) in order to further strengthen and differentiate Sony’s overall product line. The Company also plans to extend the use of these key technologies across a wide range of business applications, from security to medical, to further expand the scope of its digital imaging business. Sony will target total sales of 1.5 trillion yen and double-digit operating income margin from the consumer, professional and image sensor businesses by FY14.






Game – In the game business, Sony continues to deliver exhilarating entertainment experiences through PlayStation®3, PlayStation®Vita, and its unique combination of hardware, software, PlayStation®Network (“PSN”), and range of accessories and peripherals. These will form the foundations on which Sony will target further sales and profit expansion in the game business. The Company also aims to increase sales by enriching its catalog of downloadable game titles and subscription services available through the PSN platform, and also by expanding the lineup of PlayStation®Suite compatible devices and content. Sony will target game business sales of one trillion yen and operating income margin of 8% by FY14.

Mobile – In the area of mobile, Sony is integrating the R&D, design engineering, and sales and marketing operations of its smartphone business (operated by Sony Mobile Communications, now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sony), “Sony Tablet” and “VAIO” businesses in order to quickly develop and deliver compelling products to market. Sony also plans to aggressively leverage its many technologies in areas such as digital imaging and game, its rich content assets including pictures, music and game, its “Sony Entertainment Network” network service platform, as well as the communications technology expertise and knowhow accumulated through its experience in the mobile phone industry, to launch new mobile products and establish new business models. Additionally, by integrating operations across its entire mobile product lineup, Sony aims to achieve further efficiencies and optimization. As a result of these measures, Sony will target sales of 1.8 trillion yen in FY14 from the mobile business, and significant profitability improvement.

2. Turning around the television business

Sony is already engaged in a comprehensive television profitability improvement plan (announced November 2, 2011), which aims to return the television business to profitability in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2014 (“FY13”), and intends to accelerate these measures going forward. The sale of Sony’s share in its LCD panel manufacturing joint venture with Samsung Electronics has been completed, resulting in panel-related cost reductions. Additionally, Sony is taking further measures to change the business structure, for example by improving design engineering efficiency and reducing the number of product models (targeting a 40% reduction from the fiscal year ended March 31, 2012 (“FY11”) to the fiscal year ending March 31, 2013 (“FY12”)), with the aim of reducing fixed business costs related to the television business by 60% and operating costs by 30% in FY13 compared to FY11.

Sony is additionally taking steps to enhance the image and audio quality of its “BRAVIA” range of LCD televisions that form the cornerstone of its current television lineup and to tailor its product offering to meet specific regional market needs. Going forward, Sony intends to advance the development and commercialization of next-generation display technologies such as OLED and “Crystal LED Display”, as well as enhance the integration of televisions with Sony’s mobile products, with content such as movies and music, and with other assets across the Sony Group to improve product competitiveness, drive hardware differentiation and enhance the attractiveness of Sony’s product lineup.



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3. Expanding business in emerging markets

Sony will continue to leverage its strong global operations and brand strength to drive sales growth in rapidly expanding emerging markets.

Sony has already established strong foundations in emerging markets. For instance, in India and Mexico, among others, Sony has secured the largest share of the consumer AV/IT market. Sony will continue to concentrate its sales and marketing resources in these markets, and expects to strengthen sales operations, introduce products tailored to local needs and leverage the Sony Group’s entertainment assets, including pictures, music and television networks, to further enhance its market presence.

Sony generated 1.8 trillion yen through sales of electronics products in emerging markets* in FY11, and aims to increase this figure to 2.6 trillion yen in FY14. The Company will also aim for consumer AV/IT sales in emerging markets to represent 60% of total anticipated global sales of these products by FY14.

*Regions other than Japan, North America and Europe.


4. Creating new businesses and accelerating innovation

Sony will continue to aggressively promote innovation intended to deliver mid- to long-term growth, as well as the development of differentiating technologies that enhance core product value.

Specific examples of business areas in which Sony will target mid- to long-term growth are medical and 4K-related technologies.

Sony is largely a new entrant to the medical industry. In the medical peripherals business Sony has already successfully launched a range of medical printers, monitors, cameras, recorders and other medical-use products, and will target sales of 50 billion yen in this market in FY14. Sony also plans to enter the market for medical equipment components, where its strengths in various core digital imaging technologies offer significant competitive advantages in applications such as endoscopes. Furthermore, Sony plans to enter the life science industry, where the Company can leverage its expertise in technologies such as semiconductor lasers, image sensors and microfabrication. In the life science industry, Sony has acquired iCyt, a manufacturer of cellular analysis equipment, and Micronics, which manufactures medical and diagnostics equipment. Sony plans to continue to aggressively pursue other M&A opportunities to expand its medical business consistently with Sony’s own strengths, with the aim of developing the business into a key pillar of Sony’s overall business portfolio.

Sony is also drawing on its comprehensive strengths in audio and visual technologies to aggressively promote the growth of “4K” technology, which delivers more than four times the resolution of Full HD. Incorporation of Sony-developed technologies, such as image sensors, image processing compression LSIs and high-speed optical transmission modules into its professional-use and high-end consumer products will pave the way for Sony to continue to expand and enrich its 4K-compatible product lineup.



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5. Realigning the business portfolio and optimizing resources

Sony is accelerating its ongoing process of business selection and focus, and is concentrating its investments in core and new business areas. In terms of investment, core areas include the expansion of Sony’s image sensor manufacturing capacity, capital investment in mobile products and aggressive strategic investment in development or M&A relating to new business areas such as medical. Other existing business areas will be evaluated according to the following four criteria, so that Sony can determine the optimum strategy for these businesses, including proactive consideration of alliances and business transfers in order to optimize its overall business portfolio:

-

Loss generating, negative operating cash flow or low revenue businesses
-

Limited synergies with core businesses
-

Businesses where commoditization is advanced and prospects for growth are limited
-

Businesses where opportunities for revitalization and growth are enhanced through collaboration with partners rather than independent operation by Sony

For example, in the small- and medium-sized display business* and chemical products business**, Sony has already transferred or is in negotiations to transfer those businesses to external parties. Furthermore, Sony is also exploring possible alliances in the area of batteries for electronic vehicles and energy storage modules.

*“INCJ, Hitachi, Sony and Toshiba Sign Definitive Agreements Regarding Integration of Small- and Medium-Sized Display Businesses” announced on November 15, 2011
**”Development Bank of Japan and Sony Sign Non-Binding Memorandum of Understanding for Sale of Chemical Products Businesses” announced on March 22, 2012

In addition to this business portfolio realignment, as Sony moves to strengthen its core businesses and shift resources to growth areas, it will also restructure its headquarters, subsidiaries and sales company organizations in order to further enhance operational efficiencies. As a result of these measures, Sony estimates that the headcount across the entire Sony Group will be reduced by approximately 10,000 in FY12. This includes employees expected to transfer outside the Sony Group as part of the sale of businesses and other realignments resulting from business portfolio optimization. Sony anticipates that many of these businesses will have future growth opportunities outside the Sony Group, and Sony will consider various measures to secure continuity of employment for employees at their new destinations. Sony is projecting restructuring costs of 75 billion yen in FY12.



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Cautionary Statement

Statements made in this release with respect to Sony’s current plans, estimates, strategies and beliefs and other statements that are not historical facts are forward-looking statements about the future performance of Sony. Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, those statements using words such as “believe,” “expect,” “plans,” “strategy,” “prospects,” “forecast,” “estimate,” “project,” “anticipate,” “aim,” “intend,” “seek,” “may,” “might,” “could” or “should,” and words of similar meaning in connection with a discussion of future operations, financial performance, events or conditions. From time to time, oral or written forward-looking statements may also be included in other materials released to the public. These statements are based on management’s assumptions, judgments and beliefs in light of the information currently available to it. Sony cautions you that a number of important risks and uncertainties could cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements, and therefore you should not place undue reliance on them. You also should not rely on any obligation of Sony to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. Sony disclaims any such obligation. Risks and uncertainties that might affect Sony include, but are not limited to (i) the global economic environment in which Sony operates and the economic conditions in Sony’s markets, particularly levels of consumer spending; (ii) foreign exchange rates, particularly between the yen and the U.S. dollar, the euro and other currencies in which Sony makes significant sales and incurs production costs, or in which Sony’s assets and liabilities are denominated; (iii) Sony’s ability to continue to design and develop and win acceptance of, as well as achieve sufficient cost reductions for, its products and services, including LCD televisions and game platforms, which are offered in highly competitive markets characterized by continual new product and service introductions, rapid development in technology and subjective and changing consumer preferences; (iv) Sony’s ability and timing to recoup large-scale investments required for technology development and production capacity; (v) Sony’s ability to implement successful business restructuring and transformation efforts under changing market conditions; (vi) Sony’s ability to implement successful hardware, software, and content integration strategies for all segments excluding the Financial Services segment, and to develop and implement successful sales and distribution strategies in light of the Internet and other technological developments; (vii) Sony’s continued ability to devote sufficient resources to research and development and, with respect to capital expenditures, to prioritize investments correctly (particularly in the electronics business); (viii) Sony’s ability to maintain product quality; (ix) the effectiveness of Sony’s strategies and their execution, including but not limited to the success of Sony’s acquisitions, joint ventures and other strategic investments (in particular the recent acquisition of Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications AB); (x) Sony’s ability to forecast demands, manage timely procurement and control inventories; (xi) the outcome of pending legal and/or regulatory proceedings; (xii) shifts in customer demand for financial services such as life insurance and Sony’s ability to conduct successful asset liability management in the Financial Services segment; (xiii) the impact of unfavorable conditions or developments (including market fluctuations or volatility) in the Japanese equity markets on the revenue and operating income of the Financial Services segment; and (xiv) risks related to catastrophic disasters or similar events, including the Great East Japan Earthquake and its aftermath as well as the October 2011 floods in Thailand. Risks and uncertainties also include the impact of any future events with material adverse impact.

Sony is currently modifying its business segment classification to reflect its reorganization as of April 1, 2012. Sony expects to report its operating results in line with new business segments from the first quarter of the fiscal year ending March 31, 2013.



Media Inquiries
Corporate Communications, Sony Corporation
Tel: +81-3-6748-2200

Investor and Analyst Inquiries
IR Division, Sony Corporation
Tel: +81-3-6748-2180




http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ ... 236288.htm

[Sandimas]

Should I be excited by this? Looks like typical corporate strategy saying plenty/saying nothing.

[KissMyAss]

Sony has leverage. There is no doubt about that.

[shramiac]

You didn't get a burnt bank account after that Playstation fiasco last year did you KMA? Hope not, cause that'd suck!

[KissMyAss]

Nope. I'm just an informed consumer. And no, I'm not joining the Playstation Network. I'm not a gamer, anyway. But if you already know billing is not the strength of a company, it's best to buy products from the store instead of services off the internet.

Companies are required by law to file data with the SEC for investors. Something for investors to consider is Sony's consolidated forecast predicted a loss to investors at the fiscal year end of March 2012, due to tax expense reporting.

I am actually fairly skeptical of liability economics. It's over rated. That's the typical "corporate strategy" in my opinion. Expanding technology is the only good thing that comes out of it. Too often companies think that liability financing will save them from not developing the "whole" organization.

Yeah, some managers in the PSN security and financial departments probably thought skimping on the employment would look good on a performance evaluation...disasterous decision making from people who just cannot think outside the box.

Sony's products have always been their strength. I owned a VAIO that was almost as good as my Gateway. Unfortunately, the screen was broken on my Gateway, and I'm not discussing the reason. But, consumers are probably going to gain alot from the expansion of technology. Perhaps, seeing more products come of it.

[metatron]

I remember seeing something about Sony having this top secret PSI psychotronics division. Saw a video about it & they had armed guards at this institution. Was weird.
Here is an article relating to it if it your kind of thing.

Closing the Dream Factory: Sony Proves That Psychic Powers Are Real

 By Patrick Huyghe,
Fortean Times


Patrick Huyghe investigates the truth behind the closure of Sony's seven year paranormal research effort: A story of quiet success and corporate disappointment
This summer (1998), Japan's enormously successful electronics giant, the Sony Corporation, unloaded a bombshell when they announced that ESP exists.
They didn't exactly shout it from the rooftops, however. In fact, the findings of their seven year research programme into a variety of paranormal subjects caused nary a ripple in the summer's news. That's the way Sony wanted it, of course, and the way the company has been running its programme right from the beginning. Totally hush-hush.
Sony's jaw-dropping announcement in July was paired with another surprise. While psychic powers were real, said Sony spokesman Masanobu Sakaguchi, the company was closing down its ESP research facility. For those unfamiliar with the nitty-gritty of Sony's programme – which involved studies of qi, presentiment, synchronicity, mind-body interactions, consciousness, the sixth sense and supernatural phenomena – the visionary company left the distinct impression that it had suffered a sudden loss of vision. Here they were on top of a psychic Mt Everest and the company had decided not to capitalise on their monumental findings. Why?
Two years ago, in Las Vegas, I met Yoichiro Saka, the director of the Sony paranormal lab, heard his presentation before a group of sympathetic scientists, and spoke to him at length. This little peek into what Sony was doing – and more importantly, how it was doing it – shed some light on why it decided to pull back from the venture and close down the lab. Clearly, all was not well with the Sony programme.
Sony had shied away from discussing the lab – codenamed ESPER, which stands for "Extrasensory Perception and Excitation Research" – and preferred no publicity about it. There was no mention of it in the company's annual reports, on its web sites, or anywhere else for that matter. But coming to Vegas was Yoichiro Sako, the founder and director of the ESPER lab, to present an invited paper before the annual meeting of the Society for Scientific Exploration, an organisation consisting largely of scientists and engineers interested in UFOs, the paranormal, and other anomalous phenomena.
This was not the first time Sony let the ESPER cat out of the bag. They first came clean about its psi research in 1995 after the nerve gas subway attacks by the Aum Shinri Kyo cult aroused suspicions about occult practices. Despite Sony's reticence, the lab enjoyed widespread popularity in Japan at large, but not within the company itself. While some people in the company were interested in his work, Sako admitted to me that more than a few others thought his work was "crazy."
Yoshihiro Otsuki, a professor of physics at Waseda University, led a blistering attack against the lab when it became public. By pouring money into paranormal research, he said, "Sony might as well be denying that its products can be trusted." Otsuki went on to describe the journal which had published Sako's findings as an "occult journal."
The notion of a trendsetting company like Sony trying to develop psi-based products is rather refreshing – if not a little improbable. Why would one of the world's leading technology companies get involved in the marginal world of telepathy and clairvoyance? Certainly not for the greater good of humankind. No, Sony clearly intended to commercialise psi technology. Never mind that most scientists and engineers don't even believe psi exists; their skepticism would be moot if someone could create something – anything – useful based on psi.
A wealth of ideas based on psi technologies has been bandied about in the literature over the past couple of decades. These range from a wheelchair for quadriplegics controlled solely by intentional thought to a lock based on mental patterns rather than on fingerprints or retinal patterns. When I finally had the opportunity to ask Sako if Sony had any psi-based products in the works, he flashed a great big friendly smile – followed after a long delay by a vigorous shake of the head. There are no products. Not yet.
Sako was an unlikely man in an unlikely job. His background was strictly orthodox and, as far as I could determine, he had no more than a passing knowledge of paranormal subjects until his rise to psi fame at Sony. Sako was unwilling to say whether he possesses any psychic powers himself, although he admitted to a long interest in the subject.
In any case, he graduated from the prestigious Tokyo University with a degree in mathematics and computer science and joined Sony immediately after graduation. He first worked on CDs, CD-ROMs, and eight-millimetre video before moving on to voice recognition technology and other areas of artificial intelligence. After covering all these bases, there was only one place left to go – over the edge.
In 1989, Sako approached one of Sony's two founding fathers, Masaru Ibuka, about starting a special department to study the "human science," or bioenergy, which the Chinese call "qi." (pronounced ch'i).
Sako's proposal to study bioenergy at Sony was not a shot in the dark. It was no secret that Ibuka was interested in traditional medicine, as well as ESP. Indeed, back in 1988, Ibuka had established the Pulse Graph Research Department, which has worked on a device that claims to identify health problems by measuring the pulse. In any case, Sako's hunch proved correct and by 1990 he was doing qi research at Sony's Corporate Research Laboratory, measuring pulse, skin temperature, and other physiological changes that take place in the body while qi masters tried to alter a patient's qi energy.
By 1 November 1991, Sako had convinced the Sony founders to establish a separate laboratory, ESPER, where he could continue his qi research and range into psi topics as well. Sako was installed as the director of the five-person lab, no doubt a mere closet operation within the enormous Sony universe. But the fact that this research was taking place at all and had been budgeted – though to what extent no one would say – indicated that Sony believed Sako's paranormal research had some potential.
Clearly, however, Sony was confused over the lab's role within the company during its seven-year existence. On 1 January 1993, Sony established the Research Institute of Wisdom, which oversaw the work both of the ESPER Laboratory and the Pulse Graph Research Department. Then on 1 February 1995, the ESPER Lab was split off from the Research Institute of Wisdom and became part of the company's R&D Division.
As a long-time fan of all things Sony, I expected to be wowed by Sako's presentation in Las Vegas, but the abstract for 'Challenging an Unknown Information System' – with its emphasis on "paradigm," "turning points" and the "new age" – sounded like gobbledegook. I'd heard this kind of talk from parapsychologists, both university-affiliated and less, for decades, and I expected more from Sony.
But Sako's talk proved both surprising and in a way rather amusing. "If it is difficult for you to understand my talk due to my poor English," he began, "please understand my talk using telepathy." Sako then he pulled out his first viewgraph. Viewgraphs? Overhead projectors? This was Sony? I had expected a laptop-controlled whiz-bang digital extravaganza. I wondered if Sako could possibly be uncomfortable with technology and I noticed immediately that he did not wear eyeglasses or contacts either, though he seemed to need them. Nor did he wear a digital watch – or any watch for that matter. Could he be technophobic, I wondered? Would this carry over into his research on matters parapsychological?
But viewgraphs it was, and the first one – "Why?" written in large letters – was perfect. This was the burning question on everyone's mind, of course; why was one of the world's premier electronics giants researching psi? The answer was less than perfect. "It's quite simple," said Sako, dressed in appropriate executive attire – dark blue suit, blue shirt, and a tie striped blue, red and gold – "It's a Sony." Sako sounded like he was trying to force a square peg down a round hole. "I think Sony's spirit is making dreams," he continued, "rather than making money." Sure, I thought, and Earth is the centre of the universe.
The ESPER lab's greatest success, Sako went on to explain, had come in the field of clairvoyance, the ability to get information about physical objects or distant events that is beyond the reach of the ordinary senses. In one series of experiments, clairvoyance was defined as the ability to "see" letters and drawings on a target piece of paper without the use of sight. One subject was a 10-year-old schoolgirl. Children, Sako explained, are better at such things as clairvoyance than adults. Sako then described his amazing experiment. He would take a piece of paper about 1.5in (3.8cm) square and write or draw something on it. He would then fold it once, twice, three times and then crumple it up. Afterward the experimenter would hand the tiny wad of paper with the target on it to the subject to hold pinched between two fingers, or place the piece of paper in the subject's ear. Sako did not smile. Was he pulling our legs?
At first I thought this must be a relic behaviour from using a Sony Walkman but, after further reflection – and a look at a paper written by Sako on 'Clairvoyance and Synesthesia' in Journal of International Society of Life Information Science (March 1997) – I concluded that this experimental method must be based on the belief that clairvoyance could be due to synæsthesia, a crossing of the senses [see FT113:28-31]. Perhaps the ear could 'see' what was written on the paper? But Sako's own research on the subject showed only the slimmest evidence of synæsthesia in clairvoyance. In a total of 20 trials, there were only two examples for which the first sensation of the target was not visual, but hearing and smell.
The best method, Sako told the audience, was "in the ear." We were into deep weirdness here. And when Sako said best, he meant best. In 35 trials, the recognition rate was an astonishing 97.1 per cent; a success rate unheard of in western parapsychology experiments. There were 18 perfectly matching responses, noted Sako, including the equation "1+ 2= 5" (a result which led Sako to comment "It's wrong, but right".) Sixteen responses were so "closely matching" that most western experimenters would likely call them perfect hits. There was one false response. It was too good to be true.
How did they do this? Sako described the nine step process successful children seemed to use in clairvoyance. 1) Close the eyes, but this was not necessary. 2) Concentrate. 3) Imagine unfolding the piece of paper, but this also was not necessary. 4) A light then appears in the middle of their forehead. 5) The light expands as the surroundings darken. 6) A letter appears within the light. 7) Shift the light or letter to one side in order to read more of the image, like moving the beam of a spotlight across a billboard. Memorise each letter. 9) Write them down. Easy, isn't it?
The simpler the letters and drawings, Sako told us, the easier they are to sense. But the trials were made more difficult, he said, when the target pieces of paper were put in an envelope (though, oddly, it was still possible for the subject to sense the target in the envelope when the room was darkened). This was big news, at least to me. Why this should be true poses a real problem. For decades one of the most solid results of western parapsychological research has been that psi abilities persist regardless of space or time considerations – whether the subject or target is shielded in any way, even using lead chambers. So how could a measly envelope prevent psi?
There was one obvious explanation: placing the targets in an envelope thwarted cheating by the subjects. When I questioned Sako about this later, he insisted that no cheating was involved; the subject's tests were all videotaped. But was this enough, I wondered. One scientist who overheard Sako's remark thought that a magician should be present to ensure that no trickery was taking place, and many others expressed skepticism of Sako's results. "In a science laboratory," a professor of astronomy told me afterward, "you look out for a perfect score. If it is, then you know cheating is involved." The ESPER Lab procedures also raised serious doubts.
For others, however, Sako's results made perfect sense. Bill Higgins of PEAR Inc. in New Jersey, a company that is itself attempting to create commercial products based on psi technology – see FT106:28-31 – thought Sako was onto something. "He's shown the importance of the tactile sense," said an excited Higgins, who was planning to repeat the Sako experiments at home with his own children.
But Sako had also told the audience that clairvoyance works without having the subject touch the paper at all. This seemed to contradict his work in non-visual colour recognition, described in another paper published in the Journal of International Society of Life Information Science, which hints that there might be something to touch sight or "derma-sight."
For me, the really surprising thing about the incredible success of ESPER's clairvoyance results, was its apparent denial of technology. For a company like Sony, the incongruity of the situation was striking. In the western world, modern parapsychological research is the epitome of highly controlled hi-tech studies in which the experimenters write themselves out of the experiment. Sako's approach was so personal (becoming friends with his sensitives rather than keeping an objective distance) and low-tech that I wondered for an instant if he was not hiding Sony's true psi research from us.
Again, I questioned Sako; his reply was disarming and direct: "Yes, it's low-tech. Hi-tech is not necessary." Of course, whether the technology is low or hi matters little, as long as there is a product. But Sony had no product in mind, Sako admitted, and neither did he. And that, it now turns out, seven years after the ESPER lab began its work, was the rub.
"We found out experimentally that ESP exists," Sony spokesman Masanobu told Benjamin Fulford of the South China Morning Post for a story that appeared on 7 July, "but that any practical application of this knowledge is not likely in the foreseeable future." And so, without the promise of marketable products, Sony decided to shut down its ESPER lab.
The decision seemed to make perfect business sense; but the truth is that Sony's vaunted "vision factory" had come up short, without foresight about a subject that demanded it most. Perhaps the real reason the ESPER lab got the boot lies elsewhere. Sony's corporate culture was deeply embarrassed by the research and, when Sony founding father Masaru Ibuka died on 19 December 1997, the writing was on the lab wall.
SOURCE: Fortean Times
More headlines at http://www.mindpowernews.com

[shramiac]

Dannii! You will give me all your money!!!!

[metatron]

Too late bro. Gail (the kunt) Kelly of Westpac got in b4 u.

[shramiac]

[KissMyAss]

Too late bro. Gail (the kunt) Kelly of Westpac got in b4 u.

Is she this stupid?



If not...she can make her own damn money.